Back in the OECD...an oblique comment on the World Bank's "Better results from public sector institutions by Pollitt, Ch. (Christopher)
 1 
 
Pollitt, C. (forthcoming, 2013). Back in the OECD...an oblique comment on the World Bank's "Better 
results from public sector institutions. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 79(3). 
BACK IN THE OECD...AN OBLIQUE  COMMENT ON THE WORLD BANK’S ’BETTER RESULTS FROM 




Acknowledgement:  some of the research on which this paper is based received funding from the 
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement number 266887 (project 




BACK IN THE OECD…AN OBLIQUE COMMENT ON THE WORLD BANK’S ’BETTER RESULTS FROM 
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS’ (2012) 
 
Introduction 
Most of my thinking and experience has been focused on the developed world, rather than 
developing countries.  Thus I bring an outsider’s perspective to the World Bank’s 2012 
document, Better results from public institutions.  I am grateful to Nick Manning and Willy 
McCourt for their invitation to peer over one of the many walls which subdivide the territory 
of public administration, 
Since at least the 1950s ‘development administration’ has been a separate academic subfield; 
one often characterised, tightly or loosely, explicitly or implicitly, with the notion that its 
mission is to export the good practices of the developed world to replace the bad practices of 
the underdeveloped one.  It is easy to understand why this should appear to be a core mission.  
Few observers would disagree that the public administrations of, say, Australia, Canada or 
Denmark are superior to those of, say, Afghanistan, Somalia or Tanzania.  There are glaring 
differences in terms of available resources, the skills of public servants themselves, the 
incidence of corruption, and the quality and quantity of key public services provided, per 
capita of population. 
Nevertheless, there may be some point in reversing the usual order of business by taking the 
World Bank’s report on the experience of development administration reform as the baseline, 
and comparing the academic and official reform literature from the developed world against 
that standard.  Have we in the OECD world anything to learn from the World Bank’s 
experiences?  For this purpose I will concentrate mainly on the European literature, although 
I believe similar findings could be excavated in North America and Australasia.  To be 
provocative, I will focus on two commonplace beliefs about developed/developing world 
contrasts which I suggest should be questioned. 
Questionable belief number one:  frequent reform failure is an unfortunate characteristic of 
the developing world, but not for ‘us’ in the developed world 
To begin with, there is perhaps some corrective value in remembering that, far from public 
management reform having been routinely successful in the developed world but being beset 
with difficulties in the developing world, it appears frequently to have been problematic in 
both. A number of key recent studies of European reforms have shown that NPM-type 
innovations have frequently failed to produce any measurable change and sometimes even 
seem to have triggered deteriorations in programme or project outputs or outcomes.  First, 
Table 1 (below) summarizes some of the findings from a recently assembled database of 518 
studies of NPM reforms across the EU (Pollitt and Dan, 2011).   
Type of impact Entries (n) Improved Worse Unchanged 
Outcomes 57 44% 23% 33% 
Outputs 163 53% 20% 27% 




Table 1: Database entries for NPM reform impacts.  
Source:  Pollitt and Dan, 2011 
 
Note: Some of the 518 studies in the database contained more than one entry for 
processes/activities, outputs or outcomes (or any combination of these). Therefore an entry is 
not the same as a study, and there are more entries recorded in the Table than studies. 
 
Clearly, EU NPM reforms are not always successful. On the upside, outcomes, outputs and 
processes/activities are all reported as improving things more often than making them worse. 
On the other hand one could say that in 56% of the entries, outcomes remained the same or 
got worse (with corresponding percentages of 47% for outputs and 42% for 
processes/activities). 
 
Other recent studies confirm this general picture. First, in a Spanish econometric study of 
outsourcing and decentralization across the EU. Alonso et al (2011) found that ‘outsourcing 
was not associated with a reduction in the public sector size as regards expenditure and 
employment, either in the short or long term’ (pp27-28).   
 
Second, we turn to the conclusions of a 30 country study of agencification (Verhoest et al, 
2012).  After surveys, interviews and documentary analysis, the authors concluded that: 
‘[A]ctual research into agency performance is scarce and empirical evidence of such 
effects is still inconclusive...Also, based on our research, there is no indication that 
autonomy automatically leads to good performance; there are many different factors 
that play an important role’ (Van Thiel et al, 2012, p430). 
 
Third, we may note that Carrera et al (2009), when they looked in detail at efficiency gains in 
the UK benefit payments system, found that productivity fell rather than increased during the 
NPM-intensive period of the late 1980s and then fell again during the Blair reforms from 
1997 to 2003.  Current work by Hood and Dixon (2012) is beginning to show that an absence 
of any dramatic (10% plus) efficiency gains in other major UK government programmes too, 
even during the highpoints of the reform drives of Thatcher and Blair.  What is perhaps most 
puzzling here is that the reforming governments themselves do not seem to have been 
particularly anxious to check the overall results of their own initiatives. 
 
Fourth, we have the findings of a statistical analysis by Andrews (2011) of claims that 
competition-oriented management reforms had improved efficiency.  Reviewing the available 
quantitative studies, he found roughly equal chances of positive effects and no measurable 
effect at all, although the chances of negative effects were considerably smaller than either 
positive or no change. 
 
Fifth, we can move from academic studies to official analyses.  An independent study of UK 
central government reforms  between 2005 and 2009 found widespread failure to specifiy 
expected benefits or identify and control costs (National Audit Office, 2010; see also 
Dunleavy ??).  Probably the best single source of official data about government reforms in 
the developed world is the OECD’s annual publication Government at a glance (OECD, 
2011).  This is frequently cited by governments themselves, and is also used as the basis for 
countless academic studies and commentaries.  It is produced by a unit which has been highly 
influential, and which has worked with comparative data for more than 20 years.  Yet this 
264 page compendium contains very few measures of effectiveness or efficiency.  The vast 
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majority of the tables depict inputs and processes – how much is spent on this or that, how 
many public sector staff there are as a % of the total workforce, the state of HRM reforms, 
and so on.  The special section (new in 2011) on performance indicators displays a motley 
collection.  There are attempts to measure the fairness of taxes; average student reading 
scores related to socio-economic background, access to tertiary education, health insurance 
coverage, and life expectancy at birth.  There is not a single real input/output efficiency ratio. 
In short, there is limited hard evidence of changes of outputs and outcomes which can be 
securely attributed to specific mangement reforms. 
 
Overall, therefore, it appears that for most EU and OECD management reform programmes, 
most of the time, we have precious little good information about results.  There is an ocean of 
literature but only a trickle of high quality data on efficiency and effectiveness.  This deficit 
may well be present to a greater degree in the developing world, but it is substantial and 
widespread in the OECD world too. 
Questionable belief number two:  developed world reform documents are more sophisticated 
than is usual in development administration 
 
To continue the provocation, I would argue that one of the most striking features of Better 
results from public institutions is that the level of analysis is deeper and more nuanced, while 
the degree of self-criticism is rather higher than we are used to in many reform documents 
from the OECD world.  ‘Theories’ are recognized and discussed.  Pressures from the 
‘industry’ that has grown up around management reform are acknowledged. Weakneses in 
previous Wolrd bank practice are identified.  Let us compare the World Bank’s report with a 
selection of key UK white papers on management reform.  The UK is an appropriate 
comparator for our exercise because it was one of the pioneers of NPM reforms from the 
early 1980s, and has, since then, maintained an intense and  continuous flow of reforms 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).  It has actively marketed its know-how internationally, and has 
promoted knowledge transfers to various parts of the central and eastern European 
‘transitional’ states, and to the developing world.  
 
The white papers chosen for this comparison were :  The reorganization of central 
government (1970, Heath, Conservative), Efficiency in government (1981,Thatcher, 
Conservative); The citizen’s charter (1991, Major, Conservative), Modernising government 
(1997, Blair, Labour) and Open public services (2011, Cameron and Clegg, 
Conservative/Liebral Democrat coalition).  Of course there have been more than five white 
papers on UK public sector reform during this period, but these five have been chosen with 
certain criteria in mind.  First, they were all broad scope reform packages, not confined to a 
single sector or problem (so we exclude, for example, white papers on the reform of the 
National Health Service, or the management of schools).  Second, each identified a particular 
theme or trope around which they arranged their arguments and proposals.  Third, all of them 
came fairly early in their respective government life cycles and could thus be said to 
represent the young, or early-middle-aged  hopes of vigorous new governments. 
So, how do these documents compare with Better results?  In brief, my answer would be that 
the World Bank document contains more detailed and nuanced analysis than any of the UK 
white papers, is more willing critically to examine past efforts, and is generally more 
acknowledging that there is considerable room for debate.  None of the five white papers 
advanced the kind of context-and-process based analysis which the World Bank advanced; 
only one (Efficiency in government) contained any systematic evidence (and that was not 
very much) and none contained any extensive review of previous reform experiences, unless 
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one counts brief negative stereotyping of what had been attempted by the previous 
government (Pollitt, 2012).  Most focused on the promise of new, or allegedly new, processes 
and techniques.  These innovations were themselves seldom subject to any critical analysis.  
None costed the proposed reforms and none set quantified targets for achievement. 
In line with this general analysis, a performance audit of UK central government reforms  
between 2005 and 2009 found widespread failure to specify expected benefits or identify and 
control costs (National Audit Office, 2010; see also White and Dunleavy, 2010). 
Nor should it be thought that these limitations in reform documents are confined to UK 
central government.  Very similar comments could be made about, inter alia, major 
Australian, Dutch, French, German, Italian and US reform publications (e.g. Advisory Group 
on Reform of Australian Government 2010; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties, 2007: Ministère de la Fonction Publique et des Réformes 
Administratives, 1992; Ministry of the Interior, 2006;  Schiavo, 2000; Office of Management 
and Budget, 2001).  Naturally, there are exceptions, with more reflective and evidence-based 
approaches, but these are neither as frequent nor as prominent as the more high-wide-and-
handsome variety. 
Again, therefore, some of the characteristic weaknesses identified in the World Bank report 
are amply echoed across the OECD world. The resource- and skill-rich environment of the 




Of course, none of the foregoing is intended to suggest that public administrations in the 
developed and developing worlds are simply the same.  The differences of resources, skills, 
corruption levels etc referred to earlier are huge, and cannot be denied. Also it must be 
acknowledged that this comment is a tour d’horizon which has been aimed primarily at 
provocation, and which skates over some divergent details and a host of methodological 
difficulties (see, e.g. Pollitt and Dan, 2011).   
 
Further, it should be said that there is plenty in Better results from public institutions that 
could be questioned.  Not least, there are implementation issues:  will a finance-dominated 
institution really be able to practice a management-dominated philosophy?  Will a flat-
budgeted World Bank be able to summon the resources to make a reality of more continuous 
engagement with clients?  Can the new approach ensure that the previous emphasis on 
‘upstream’ issues is balanced and integrated with an attention to the ‘downstream’ problems 
that often prevent a better service from actually getting through to citizens? However, the 
critique of Better results is well underway elsewhere in this symposium, and is not my prime 
concern here. 
 
 What is suggested here, however, is that (to quote the first page of Better results) ‘”What 
works” in PSM [Public Sector Management] is highly context-dependent and explicit 
evidence remains limited’.  This observation applies almost as much to the developed world 
as to the developing.  To put it another way, humility is undersung as a management reform 
virtue - globally.  In both worlds reform talk is often much more ambitious than the formal 
decisions that eventually get taken, and there is then frequently a substantial implementation 
gap between what was decided and what finally gets put into operational practice.  This 
feature carries the strong implication that in our assessments we need to be careful to treat 
like with like: to compare talk with talk and practices with practices, and not confuse the 
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different stages. The pattern of talk may well be a poor guide to the pattern of practice 
(Pollitt, 2002).  In both worlds ‘best practice’has too often been the enemy of ‘best fit’.  In 
both worlds political realities (or ‘political economy factors’ in the World Bank’s rather 
quaint jargon) have frequently been underestimated at the launch, only to emerge later to 
defeat or dilute the reform in question.  Public management reform is almost always political 
as well as technical/organizational. 
 
Furthermore, reform evaluations have frequently been ambiguous or unconvincing even in 
those cases where they have been attempted. In more cases - in fact probably in most cases - 
no credible evaluation (and certainly no independent, scientifically-designed evaluation) has 
been carried out.  Public management reform has frequently been more an act of faith than a 
piece of evidence-based policymaking.  
Finally, management reform is frequently an iterative exercise, over considerable periods of 
time. Reformers must adapt and also take advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’. This 
implies a locally knowledgable presence over time, not a one-shot ‘quick fix’ by visiting 
consultants (Pollitt, 2008).  The World Bank has recognized this, and, here as elsewhere, its 
message could, with advantage, be more widely attended to in the OECD world also. 
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